Resilient navigation for defence platforms

The operational problem

GNSS interference is now routine near conflict zones¹ and, according to researchers analysing aircraft broadcast data, increasingly common elsewhere too.² For defence platforms the concern is not only loss of position but deliberate deception: a spoofed receiver can report a confident, wrong answer.

Resilience therefore depends on sources that do not share GNSS's vulnerabilities, and on the ability to notice when any source is lying.

What “resilient PNT” should mean in a requirement

• Bounded error over a defined outage — for example, maximum horizontal error after a stated time without GNSS, at the altitudes and speeds the platform actually flies.
• Diversity of sources — a US DOT assessment concluded that pursuing multiple technologies is the best route to resilient PNT.³
• Integrity — the system should flag and exclude faulty or manipulated inputs, not just blend them.
• Graceful degradation — predictable behaviour as sources drop out.

Designing an honest evaluation

1. Representative conditions. Test on the target platform class, at operational altitudes and speeds, over terrain representative of missions.
2. A clear baseline. Compare against the platform's inertial solution without GNSS, and state the inertial grade used.
3. Defined metrics. Horizontal error over time, error at end of outage, time to bound error after aiding resumes, and integrity alarms raised.
4. Full disclosure of conditions. Route, duration, map sources and resolution, weather and space-weather conditions.
5. Independent data handling. Truth data held by the programme, not the vendor, where possible.
6. Adversarial testing. Include spoofing and jamming scenarios to confirm the integrity layer behaves as specified.

Platform integration

• Size, weight and power. Budget for the complete module, including any processing and power conditioning, not just the sensing element.
• Magnetic hygiene. For magnetic aids, the platform's own field is usually the largest error source; sensor location and compensation manoeuvres must be planned early.⁴
• EMI/EMC. Plan qualification to the programme's EMC standard as part of integration, and verify that the aid neither suffers from nor causes interference.
• Navigation filter interfaces. Agree measurement models, timing and integrity outputs with the integrator of the navigation solution.

Sovereignty and the Canadian context

Supply-chain assurance and domestic capability are increasingly part of navigation procurement. In Canada, the National Research Council plans to invest more than $900 million under the Defence Industrial Strategy, including more than $161 million over five years for quantum technology.⁵ In August 2026 National Defence launched a Quantum Defence Innovation Secure Hub led by the University of Calgary, with GNSS-independent navigation among its focus areas.⁶

Limitations to keep in mind

• No independent navigation aid performs equally well in every environment; each should be judged against the platform's mission profile.
• Demonstration results rarely transfer directly from one platform to another.
• Passive aids avoid emitting signals, but their measurements can still be affected by local environments and platform interference.

Where Orbital Quantum fits

Orbital Quantum is a Canadian company developing True North Navigation™ quantum magnetometer modules for GPS-independent positioning. The system operates passively — it transmits nothing, so there is no emitted signal for an adversary to detect or deny.

See Orbital Quantum's sovereignty position and Founder's Edition access. Please do not send classified, export-controlled or otherwise sensitive technical information through this website.

Sources

1. EASA — EASA and EUROCONTROL joint action plan on GNSS interference (26 Mar 2026) — www.easa.europa.eu
2. Lo et al. — Global incidents of aviation spoofing 2024–2025, ION ITM 2026 (Stanford GPS Lab) — web.stanford.edu
3. US DOT / Volpe — Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report (Jan 2021) — www.transportation.gov
4. Gnadt et al. — Signal enhancement for magnetic navigation challenge problem (2020) — arxiv.org
5. National Research Council Canada — New programs to support Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy (9 Mar 2026) — www.canada.ca
6. National Defence — Canada’s first Quantum Defence Innovation Secure Hub (6 Aug 2026) — www.canada.ca